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1 INTRODUCTION 
Is our freedom of contract becoming "miltonian"? Will it be seen as a part 
of "paradise lost" because of its numerous limitations by statutory law? Or 
is there substance in the suggestion that the paradise of freedom of 
contract might be regained through its promotion to the rank of a funda-
mental right, horizontally applicable? Is freedom of contract horizontally 
applicable? Strictly speaking, this would imply the right of one party to sue 
the other for having restricted the first party's freedom of contract by 
means of a clause included in their agreement. 
There are a number of terms in various contracts which are meant to 
restrict the freedom of one party to make parallel agreements with third 
parties - non-competition clauses, exclusivity agreements, clauses restrict-
ing the right of one shareholder to pass his or her shares to a third person 
by requiring the agreement of the rest of the share-holders in the com-
pany. These terms are valid within the limits imposed by freedom of trade 
and competition (non-competition and exclusivity clauses must not be 
unduly antkompetitive) or by the right of private ownership of property 
(the share-holder's right to pass his ownership of the shares to someone 
else must not be suppressed). Freedom of contract justifies such clauses 
rather than holding them at bay; where a limitation or prohibition is 
regarded as valid, it is based on another freedom or fundamental right. 
Direct evidence of the horizontal application of freedom of contract is 
not to be found in French law. The question remains that of its vertical 
application between individuals and the state. May the state, for example, 
by legislation restrict freedom of contract? Will a private citizen be able to 
successfully challenge state interference in, and limitation of, freedom of 
contract? Will such success be ensured by the state's commitment to an 
international convention which protects freedom of contract, or by a 
constitutional principle in terms of which freedom of contract is accorded 
the status of a fundamental prerogative of the individual? 
Is freedom of contract a fundamental right in French law? In French 
constitutional law the answer to this question is twofold. On the one hand, 
there is no doubt that freedom of contract is a "fundamental principle of 
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this right may be regulated only by an Act of Parliament and not by a decree 
issued by the government. Both the Constitutional Council' and the Council of 
State2 have contributed to the protection of freedom of contract by putting it 
out of reach of infringement by the exercise of governmental powers. On 
the other hand, any French lawyer who would label freedom of contract as a 
fundamental right, that is, a right which may not be restricted or suppressed 
even by Act of Parliament, would have to Challenge the authority of the 
Constitutional Council, which by its decision 97-388 DC,l made it clear that: 
"[tJhe principle of freedom of contract has in itself no constitutional value; a 
claim of violation of this principle is examined by the Constitutional Council only 
in the case where it may lead to the violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights 
and liberties. There is no ground in the Declaration of Human Rights or any other 
norm of constitutional value for any such constitutional principle as the alleged 
freedom of the will". 
Yet, notwithstanding this decision, two questions arise. If freedom of con-
tract is not a principle of constitutional value, could it, nevertheless. be 
regarded as a fundamental right? And. indeed, should it be so regarded? 
2 COULD FREEDOM OF CONTRACT BE REGARDED AS A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT? 
In terms of European law freedom of contract could be indirectly pro-
tected through other fundamental rights or general principles. In France. 
the Constitutional Council could declare invalid statutory provisions which 
restrict freedom of contract if they violated freedom of enterprise. 
2.1 European Law 
Both European Community Law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights could grant indirect protection to freedom of contract. 
2.1.1 European Community Law 
Although freedom of contract does not emerge as a general principle of 
European Community law, the European Court of Justice has consecrated 
certain principles and fundamental rights which, in order to be effective. 
imply a certain amount of freedom of contract. These are essentially the 
right of private ownership to propertl and the right of free exercise of 
economic activity. The standard of protection of the freedom of economic 
activity could be fairly applicable to freedom of contract as well. It is, 
according to the European Court of Justice, "subject to limitations justified 
by the objectives of general interest of the European Community. pro-
vided these limitations do not alter the substance of the right".5 
I Constitutional Council 59-1 FNR 27 Nov 1959 Rec 71. 
2 Council of State 3 Oct 1980 Federation jranr;aise des professionnels immobi/iers et 
commerciaux Rec 348; 7 Feb 1986 Ass FO Consommateurs et autres Rec 31; 20 Jan 1989 
SA Berry-Loire Rec 26. 
3 20 March \997 JORF 26 March \997 4661; (1997) 30 RFDC 333 sobs L Favoreu. 
4 13 Dec J 97944/79 LiseloUe Hauer/Land Rheinland Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727. 
5 27 Sept 1979230/78 Eridiana/Ministre de tAgriculture et des Forets [1979] ECR 2749 10 
JUly 1991 C 90/90 and C 91/90 Neu v Secretaire d'Etat Ii {'Agriculture et Ii la Viticulture 










































HOBjZONTt\l..APPLlCATIONTHEORY:-:.A FRENCH POINT OF VIEW 
It must be added that freedom of contract is at least recognised as a 
principle in certain areas of European Union law, and noticeably so by 
Regulation 1103-976 preparing Europe's transition to its new currency, the 
Euro. The measure aims at achieving a compromise between the principle 
of continuity of contractual agreements where a performance is expressed 
in one of the former currencies of the Member States, and the principle of 
freedom of contract. 
The extent to which contractual terms might derogate from the pro-
visions of this Regulation, and the manner in which they might balance 
the contractual duties of the parties in terms of the new currency, remain 
arguable. There is, for instance, a controversy as to whether the parties 
could consider the transition to the Euro as "hardship", leading to a re-
negotiation of the contract under a hardship clause. Furthermore, stipu-
lations which may be held valid in terms of Regulation 1103-97 may, 
especially in insurance and banking contracts, create a significant im-
balance in the contractual duties of the parties, thus failing to comply with 
the test set by Directive 93-13 EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts. 7 
It appears that the question in dispute is not so much that of the 
recognition of the freedom of contract as a fundamental right, as that of 
the measure of freedom to be left in the hands of a party enjoying a 
position of dominance in the contractual relationship. Should the alpha 
and omega of the law of contract not be fairness rather than freedom? In 
recent years, good faith has increasingly become a matter of policy -
hence a "fundamentalistic" view of freedom of contract would be inappro-
priate if it were to cause a drastic limitation of the power to use legislation 
to advance the requirement of good faith. In situations of gross economic 
inequality between the parties to a contract, good faith can simply not be 
left to the good will of one of the parties, even though a degree of 
protection of freedom of contract has to be maintained. 
2.1.2 European Convention on Human Rights 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, a degree of protection 
of the freedom of contract could be achieved through article 1 of the First 
Protocol.s But the at[empt to guarantee freedom of contract via the right 
of property is subject to difficulties. As a fundamental right, the right to 
property does in fact mean the free use of one's possessions, but the use 
of property rights has to be subject to limitations in the public interest. The 
legislator'S appreciation of the public interest must be respected as long as it 
is not manifestly unreasonable, because the state must be left in command 
[1991J ECR 13618; 13 Nov 1990 C 370/88 Criminal Proceedings/Marshall [I 990J ECR I 
4071. 
6 OJ L 162 17 June 1997. 
7 OJ 1993 L 95/29 5 April 1993. 
8 "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 










































of economic and social policies. The means to use property rights are 
contracts; limiting and regulating the use of one's possessions necessarily 
means restricting freedom of contract. For instance, statutory law re-
ducing rents or postponing eviction of tenants after termination of the 
lease has not been found by the European Court of Human Rights9 to be 
invalid. Protecting freedom of contract through the right of property may 
have been a classical civil law concept since. in the Code Napoleon. con-
tracts are basically considered as means to acquire property. But the Code 
Napoleon was the Code of uti possidentes while present day private law is 
the law of the "busy entrepreneur". Constitutional law in France has. so to 
speak. a more "economically correct" approach to freedom of contract 
when linking it to freedom of enterprise. 
2.2 Constitutional law 
In all cases up to this day. claims of violation of an alleged constitutional 
principle of freedom of contract have been associated with alleged 
violations of freedom of enterprise. As stated by the Constitutional Council 
in its decision 97-388 DC: 
"The freedom of enterprise. which is neither general nor absolute. is exercised 
within legislative limits (provided) the restrictions established by the legislator 
do not produce excessive alterations of the nature and aim of this freedom." 
This leaves the legislator with a discretionary power as long as its poliCies 
are justified by and proportionate with objectives of public interest. For 
instance, in decision 97-388 DC. a contractual term by which an employer 
may prohibit participation by his or her employees in any other pension 
fund than the one he or she had established. was held as valid even 
though it might restrict freedom of contract. Similarly. a term requiring 
insurance companies to adhere to a specific government agreement when 
managing a pension fund. was not considered to be in violation of the 
freedom of enterprise. 
In other cases the approach of the Constitutional Council has been 
consistently the same. A 40 % tax to finance educational projects for 
labourers which was levied on the resources of a fund collecting con-
tributions from employers. has for instance been held not to be in 
violation of freedom of contract. 'O Similarly it has been decided that the 
reqUirements of a special agreement with the Ministry of Social Affairs for 
the establishment of privately run companies which pay pensions to 
workers who do not benefit from the general social security pension 
system. may be restrictive of freedom of contract. but that no constitutional 
norm guarantees this freedom." 
Statutory provisions which reqUire a written form and certain specific 
clauses in contracts relating to an advertising campaign. have been held to 
9 Mellacher 19 Dec 1989 A Series no 1 69; Sco/lo 28 Sept 1995 A Series no 315-C. 
10 96·385 DC 30 Dec 1996 jORF 31 Dec 1996 19557. 
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be consistent with transparency of economic activities, which is an 
objective of public interest, and therefore the freedom of enterprise is not 
violated. 12 As far as freedom of contract is concerned. the Constitutional 
Council in that decision did not even bother to consider the argument that 
it might be unduly restricted. 
The Constitutional Council had previously adopted the same approach 
in its decision 88-244 Oc. 13 A provision in an amnesty law obliging an 
employer to re-integrate a dismissed worker and trade unionist was examined 
by the Council only with reference to violation of freedom of enterprise. 
while there also was a claim of violation of freedom of contract. In theory, 
a restriction on freedom of contract which would violate freedom of 
enterprise could be considered as unconstitutional. In practice, this has 
not yet been the case. But, after all, should it be? 
3 SHOULD FREEDOM OF CONTRACT BE REGARDED AS A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT? 
Even though this remains pure theory, it can be argued that freedom of 
contract should be of constitutional value. However, it is not infrequent 
that contracts contain clauses restrictive of fundamental rights. Even if 
freedom of contract has no constitutional value, contractual restrictions on 
economic or personal freedoms. such as freedom of trade, the right of 
privacy, sexual freedom, and so on, remain under judicial control. The 
gains of "constitutionalisation" should not be measured without at the 
same time considering the cost. One has to know what might be lost. and 
may predict it by considering what has already been lost. 
3.1 What might be lost? 
There already are examples of cases in which the court has allowed the 
contract to limit a fundamental right. The Cour de Cassation in the Dame 
Roy case" accepted that a contract between a catholic school and a 
teacher could validly stipulate that if the teacher re married after having 
been divorced. she could be dismissed. It is true that the Cour de Cassation's 
decision was not based on respect for freedom of contract, but on respect 
for the catholic character of the school .. the idea was that a teacher in a 
catholic school should behave in accordance with the doctrine of the 
Church. Yet, this case may give an indication of what too much freedom 
of contract in the hands of employers might lead to, especially if they 
relied on the Constitution. 
12 92-316 DC 20 Jan 1993 RjC 1-516; RFDC 14-1993 obs L Favoreu J Frayssinet X Philippe 
T Renoux A Roux; Petites Ajjiches 2 June 1993 4 obs B Mathieu M Verpeaux. 
13 20 July 1988 RjC I 334; RDP 1989 no 2 399 obs L Favoreu; AIJC IV 1988 392 405 obs B 
Genevois; jCP 1989 II 21202 obs M Paillet; D 1989 269 obs F Luchaire Droit social 
1988 755 obs X Pre tot; AjDA 1988 P 753 obs P Wachsmann. 
14 Assemblee pI einiere 19 May 1978 Association Sainte Marthe/Dame Roy D 1978 541; 










































3.2 What has already been lost? 
It appears. though. that freedom of contract need not be "constitu-
tionalised" in order to protect it. This is exemplified by the recent history 
of competition law in France. Before 1986. the refusal by one professional 
to sell or provide services to another professional or to a consumer was 
both a tort and a penal offence. The prohibition of such a refusal to supply 
goods or services was considered to be a very significant restriction on 
freedom of contract. since such freedom entails the autonomous discre-
tion to select one's partner in a contractual agreement. and the choice to 
conclude the contract or not. By Regulation of I December t 986 the 
prohibition was maintained, but it was no longer a criminal offence. except 
in professional or consumer relationships. When the Regulation was revised 
on I December 1996. this penal offence was maintained. but no longer 
applied to relationships between professionals, protecting only consumers. 
Freedom of contract, without ever being admitted into the realm of 
fundamental rights. has substantially gained ground over freedom of 
competition during the last decade. The corrosion of the prohibition on 
the refusal to sell or provide services. especially between professionals. is 
similarly anti-competitive in effect. while there is little doubt that fair 
competition is a fundamental requirement in a free-market economy. 
One may thus justifiably question whether the paradise of freedom of 
contract is worth regaining at the cost of diminished commercial fairness. 
The economic and ethical desirability and acceptabilty of such a paradise 
may. to say the least. be doubted. 
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